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INDEPENDENCE OF THE PROVINCIAL JUDICIARY 
Valente v. The Queen, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 193 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Recently the independence of Ontario Justices of the Peace was tested 
against the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the High Court of 
Justice*. That Court found that these members of the judiciary are, 
in view of matters ancillary to their appointment and employment, not 
independent within the meaning of s. 11 ( d) of the Charter which 
assures the right to be tried by an independent and impartial 
tribunal. Hence they were prohibited from presiding over trials. 
Mr. Valente found himself before an Ontario Provincial Court Judge in 
respect to the 9ffence of careless driving under the provincial High-
way Traffic Act. The Judge declined jurisdiction. He reasoned that 
in view of his appointment and matters respecting his tenure, 
remuneration and pension, it should be considered by a superior court 
if he was too dependent on the executive branch of government (the 
prosecuting state) to be considered independent. 
The provisions of the Ontario provincial Court Act, the Public Service 
Act and the Public Service Superannuation Act are applicable to 
Ontario Provincial Court Judges and appear to make them dependent on 
the cabinet. 
For instance: 
1. the salary for Provincial Court Judges is at the whim of Cabinet 
and not the legislature; 
2. pensions are restricted or not available under certain circum-
stances; 
3. the Judges are subject to special assignments and appointments by 
the Cabinet; 
4. their documents, notes and papers are subject to rules by the 
Attorney General; 
5. the Deputy Attorney General has powers somewhat akin to manage-
ment rights in respect to a judge's "employment with the 
government"; etc. 
* Re Currie and Niagara Escarpment Commission, 13 c.c.c. (3d) 35. 
Also see Volume 19, page 3 of this publication. 
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It seems to follow that if the executive branch of government has such 
controls in respect to the welfare and tenure of these judges, they do 
not appear to be impartial. In criminal proceedings the legal dispute 
is between the accused and the State. The defence reasoned that the 
Ontario Provincial Court system was akin to a referee being employed 
by one of the parties facing one another in a contest. 
This question of independence ended up before the Supreme Court of 
Canada which heard from many provincial intervenants including a 
judicial association. 
The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue in the broadest way. 
It considered whether one single matter or all employment conditions 
collectively would cause the Provincial Court Judges in Ontario not to 
be "independent and impartial". The Court observed that independence 
and impartiality constitute a dual requirement and emphasized that the 
one is distinct from the other-.---
The Courts which decided on this case before it reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada had applied a test known as "reasonable apprehension 
of bias". That test is aimed to determine impartial! ty, but does it 
meet the needs to test independence? The Supreme Court of Canada 
said: 
"Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the 
tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a 
particular case. The word "impartial" ••• connotes absence 
of bias, actual or perceived". 
In regards to the word "independent" the Court said: 
"... (it) reflects or embodies the traditional constitu-
tional value of judicial independence. As such, it 
connotes not merely a state of mind or attitude in the 
actual exercise of judicial functions, but a status or 
relationship to others, particularly to the Executive 
Branch of Government that rests on objective conditions or 
guarantees". 
The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the histori~al need for impa:.:.·ti-
ality and independence in relation to the political governing bodies. 
By quoting from international committee reports the Court also 
associated itself with opinions that impartiality and independence 
must include separation from corporate giants which in these modern 
days grow nationally and internationally. Entanglement with the 
political scene and with financial, corporate and business interests 
will contaminate the necessary attributes prerequisite to the judicial 
function in a free and democratic society. This test must not only be 
applied to the judiciary as individuals but also the "institutional 
relationships". That means the working conditions of the judges and 
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the conditions affecting the administration of the court to which the 
judge is appointed, which includes the administrative relationship 
b~tween that Court and the executive branch of government. In other 
words, if the institution is not independent then neither are the 
persons presiding over its proceedings. In addition, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, said that even if the individual judge is clear of 
political and business entanglements, and his working conditions and 
his court meet all requisites to independence, then what can also 
cause a ·judge not to be "impartial or independent" is "... how a 
tribunal will actually act in a particular adjudication, and a 
tribunal that does not act in an independent manner cannot be held 
independent within the meaning of s. ll(d) of the Charter ..... 
Finally, the Court reminded that apparent and actual impartiality are 
of equal importance. Said the Court: 
"Both independence and impartiality are fundamental not 
only to the capacity to do justice in a particular case, 
but also to individual and public confidence in the 
administration of justice". (Emphasis is mine) 
There is no doubt that the Constitution Act (which includes the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) has substantially increased judicial 
power. The Courts as constitutional referees, have for instance power 
to declare legislation "without force or effect". By means of 
constitutional assignments in addition to the couunon law function to 
interpret the law, the courts have gained in their law making 
function. Consequently the matter of independence and impartiality on 
the part of our judiciary are now more sensitive and must receive 
greater attention than they did before. Hence it is advocated by many 
that considering the many criminal cases concluded in our lower 
courts, the provisions for superior court judges in sections 99 and 
100 of the Constitution Act of 1867 should also apply to the judiciary 
of our lower courts. These sections provide: 
1. tenure of office is during good behaviour (corrupt and criminal 
behaviour only are justification for removal from office); 
2. removal from office can only be "on address of the Senate and 
House of Commons"; and 
3. remunerations, allowances and pensions shall be fixed by Parlia-
ment. 
The advocates submit that where these sections refer to House of 
Commons and Parliament, we must for Provincial Court Judges substitute 
"Provincial Legislative Assemblies". 
To determine in this Valente case if the Ontario Provincial Court 
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Judge was independent and impartial at the time the accused appeared 
before him in regard to an allegation of careless driving, the Supreme 
Court of Canada firstly looked at the Judge's tenure and the security 
of that tenure, The Provincial Court Act of Ontario provided that the 
Judge could be removed from office only "for misbehaviour or for 
inability to perform his duties properly". 
Such misbehaviour or inability must be determined by a Superior Court 
Justice by means of an inquiry during which the subject judge has, of 
course, a right to participate fully. The Superior Justice must then 
file his report with the Ontario Legislative Assembly. But whatever 
the recommendations are, the Cabinet is not bound to act on it. Since 
the impartiality and independence of this provincial court judge was 
challenged, the Ontario government amended the Provincial Court Act. 
Now the provincial court judges can only be removed by the Cabinet if: 
(a) a complaint has been lodged with the Judicial Council; 
(b) a judicial inquiry has been made and results in a recommendation 
of removal; and, in addition, 
(c) an address of the Legislative Assembly. 
The Supreme Court of Canada found that these current provisions are 
sufficient to provide the necessary security of tenure for a 
provincial court judge. 
The second matter considered was the financial security of the provin-
cial court judge. The wages of the judges and their pensions are 
established at the whim of the executive branch of government. It was 
submitted that these matters should be decided by the Legislative 
Assembly. A further argument was that the judges should get paid 
directly from the "coffers" and should not be included in the budget 
of any ministry. The remuneration of provincial court judges are 
usually included in the budgets of the Attorneys General with the 
salaries established through Regulations (Orders in Council). The 
Supreme Court of Canada made an interesting observation when they held 
that it would be preferable for judges' salaries to be established by 
the Legislative Assembly. Whether these salaries are established by 
Regulations or Legislat~oc, in both situations the law would be 
initiated by the executive oranch of government. The c-nly difference 
would be, that if the salaries would come via the legislative route 
they would be subject to public debate in the House. Concluding that 
in the situation in question, the salaries are established by law, the 
procedure does not raise a reasonable apprehension in regards to 
impartiality or independence on the part of Ontario provincial court 
judges. 
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The third consideration was whether the executive branch of government 
was involved in the Court's administration to the extent that it 
affected the independence of the judges. The question was the 
requisite administrative autonomy by the judges to meet the 
independence under s. 11 of the Charter. Should the administration 
include assigning courtrooms; supervision over the quality of the work 
by court staff; selection and hiring of those personnel; the 
preparation of budgets for the Courts and all ancillary (including 
personnel management) matters thereto? No province has given their 
provincial court judges' such autonomy. Though such autonomy may be 
desirable it is not essential to meet the standards of independence 
under the Charter, held the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court also 
recognized that such institutional autonomy would be riddled with 
problems and inconsistencies. It found that the institutional 
independence of the provincial court in Ontario is now adequate to 
consider the members of the provincial judiciary independent, despite 
control by the executive branch of government over the salaries of 
discretionary benefits for judges and control over the management of 
the support services to the Court. 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal was 
dismissed. 
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THEFT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
Regina v. Offley, Alberta Court of Appeal, April 1986, 
No. 8503-9075-A. 
The accused, a retired policeman, went into private security and 
investigative work. He was in need of information contained in the 
national and local police computers. He applied for access to the 
computers but his request was denied. He then approached a constable 
in the record section and offered him money for information. The 
constable reported the offer to his superiors and the accused was set 
up; the constable supplied information and the accused paid. 
Consequently he was convicted of counselling the constable to counn.it 
theft; and with corruptly paying the constable to procure the offence 
of theft of information (bribery). He appealed the conviction. 
Needless to say 'the sole and kernel question to be decided was whether 
confidential information is capable of being stolen in terms of theft 
as defined and made culpable by the Criminal Code of Canada. 
A couple of years ago the Ontario Court of Appeal considered in a 
similar case* if' confidential information is capable of being stolen. 
The Court answered in the affirmative but held that it only amounts to 
theft when the information is removed or taken so it is not available 
to the owner any more. Getting access to information only for the 
purpose of intelligence gathering without depriving the owner of that 
very information, does not amount to theft. In other words, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal held that confidential information is 
"property" as defined in s. 2. C.C. that can be stolen if the owner is 
deprived of it. 
One Ontario Justice had reasoned that taking confidential information 
causes it to lose its confidentiality and it cannot be left or 
returned in the condition in which it was when taken. The Justices of 
the Alberta Cous:T of Appeal in this Offley case did not think such 
consideration u~cessliry. Classifying information "confidential" is 
pegging a quality to it. Quality has never been s factor to determine 
if something is property. 
In respect to loss of confidentiality upon the officer giving the 
accused the information, the Alberta Court observed that the 
information was never taken away. Furthermore, wondered the Court, 
does, for instance, revealing a secret entrusted by a friend amount to 
committing a theft? What about plagerism, violation of copyrights, 
* R. v. Stewart 5 C.C.C. (3d) 481 
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advertently reading a confidential memorandum, etc.? The Court 
recognized that civil law Courts award injunctions as well as damages 
in respect to breach of contract or confidence. In business, secrets 
are valuable and are legally sold and bought. Secrets have commercial 
value but are not property for the purpose of theft. There may well 
be civil liability for breaching confidences if there are 
consequential damages. But there is no criminal liability. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal quoted from a text book: 
"It does not assert that appropriating value without 
appropriating property is theft". 
Hence, confidential information is incapable of criminally being 
stolen. 
Accused's appeal allowed. 
Conviction quashed. 
* * * * * 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT DELAY 
TIME FOR BREATH TESTS RUNNING OUT 
Regina v. Frebowski, County Court of Westminster, No. X016236, New 
Westminster Registry. 
The accused was found driving while he appeared impaired by alcohol. 
A demand was properly made for samples of his breath and he was told 
of his right to counsel. Everything happened with dispatch including 
him being taken to the breathalyzer. Just before the operator was to 
take the samples the accused made it known that he firstly wished to 
speak with a lawyer. He was immediately given a phone and privacy. 
In 10 minutes the accused made several calls and was unsuccessful in 
contacting a lawyer. For another 13 minutes the officer made four 
calls on behalf of the accused. The attempts to reach a lawyer were 
without avail. Considering the statutory time limitations for the 
tests to be done, there were only a few minutes left to spare; perhaps 
enough time to make a few more calls. However the technician insisted 
that the accused complied with the demand made of him. He refused and 
was convicted accordingly. The accused appealed submitting that not 
utilizing the few spare minutes to make further attempts to contact a 
lawyer amounted to an infringement of his right to counsel and gave 
him a reasonable excuse to refuse. 
The accused's counsel argued that although police were very co-
operative, allowed him to make a number of calls, and even assisted 
him, several numbers the accused (as well as the officer) dialed were 
either "busy" or "no longer in service". The trial judge had not 
taken this in consideration when he had concluded that the accused had 
received fair treatment and that therefore his rights had not been 
infringed. 
Defence counsel apparently also made a plea that the Charter is 
supreme law and supersedes the provisions of the Criminal Code. The 
two hour time limit for taking breath samples is a legislative 
provision of an evidentiary shortcut favoring the Crown. It provides 
fuC' .::..dduC'.ing the results of ana~yses by means of a certificate and 
allows it to be presumed that tho:.. blcGd alcohol level at the time of 
analysis is equivalent to that at the time of driving. The accused 
had to forego his rights granted him by supreme law to accommodate the 
Crown's evidentiary convenience provided for by ordinary statute law. 
The accused had not deliberately lingered; his attempts and intent to 
make contact with a lawyer had been sincere. He should have been 
permitted to continue those attempts until he had completely exercised 
his right. If the samples, as a result would have been given outside 
the two-hour period the Crown would not have been estopped from 
- 9 -
prosecuting the accused. It only would have to call the breathalyzer 
technician to prove the analyses and an expert to prove the blood 
alcohol level at the time of driving. A citizen should not have to 
relinquish a constitutional right to make the prosecution process more 
convenient for the State. (The reasons for judgement are not too 
clear on this presumed submission by defence counsel. However, what 
it does contain is sufficient to infer that this was the tenor and 
drift of his argument). 
The County Court Judge held that other cases which appear similar on 
the surface are distinct from this case. In the others there had been 
sufficient time left within the two hour period to make further 
attempts to contact counsel. The time given to the accused was 
reasonable and the authorities had treated him fairly and in 
compliance with his rights. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * 
Another case similar in circumstances was decided in the same level of 
Court in respect to Regina v. Willey (No. X016720), New Westminster 
Registry. 
The accused had appealed his conviction for refusing to blow. He was 
under demand to give breath samples and was made aware of his right to 
counsel. He requested to make a long distance call to his lawyer. He 
spoke to his counsel from 1:31 a.m. till 2:04 a.m. He was then asked 
to hang up as police were running out of time. He continued to speak 
to his lawyer for another three minutes when another request was made 
to terminate the call. He complied but told police that since they 
were short of the prerequisite reasonable and probable grounds, he, on 
the advice of his lawyer, refused to give any breath samples. At 
trial and in this appeal hE.! argued that being forced to terminate the 
phone call after 36 minutes amounted to depriving him of receiving 
legal advice. 
The accused had been given ample time to receive adequate legal 
advice, held the Court. He acted on that advice and gave reasons. As 
it turned out the advice was wrong and so was the accused's perception 
of what his rights to counsel were in the circumstances. 
Also that appeal had been dismissed and his 
conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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ARREST OF PASSENGER IN CAR FILLED WITH MARIHUANA SMOKE -
UNREASONABLE SEARCH; ARBITRARY DETENTION; AND 
INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Regina v. Guberman, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 406 
Manitoba Court of Appeal 
The accused was a passenger in a car stopped in a road block to check 
for impaired drivers. A strong smell of marihuana smoke was detected 
and after some discussion the driver handed over a bag of marihuana to 
the officer. The accused was also arrested and informed of his right 
to counsel. He was promised to be afforded an opportunity to phone 
counsel as soon as they would get to the police station. However, 
before allowing the accused to phone, the officers searched him and 
found marihuana hidden on his person. Innnediately after the search he 
was allowed to call his counsel. The accused was firstly acquitted of 
the charge of possession of a narcotic. The Crown's appeal was 
allowed and the accused went to the Manitoba Court of Appeal appealing 
this reversal of his acquittal. 
The grounds for appeal were: 
1. The arrest was not based on reasonable and probable grounds and 
amounted to an arbitrary detention contrary to the accused's 
right (s. 9 of the Charter); 
2. The search by which the narcotics were found was unreasonable and 
contrary to s. 8 of the Charter; 
3. There was a denial of right to counsel in that the search caused 
delay in contacting a lawyer who could have rendered advice; 
AND 
4. That the trial judge had erred in admitting the narcotics and the 
certificate of analysis into evidence despite the infringements 
of rights by means of •·!hich the evidence had been obtained. 
The accused reasoned that the officers had acted on mere suspicion. 
The accused was not known to police and the car he was a passenger in 
happened to be stopped by police in a road check. The arrest was 
therefore illegal in that police lacked reasonable and probable 
grounds in respect to the accused and so was the subsequent search by 
which the marihuana was found. The police action had been illegal in 
its entirety claimed the accused, and to seriously consider the weight 
of evidence obtained by such illegal means would surely bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
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The Manitoba Court of Appeal concluded that considering the circum-
stances, police had the reasonable and probable grounds for beiieving 
that the accused had committed or was about to commit an indictable 
offence. There was marihuana in the car and ample evidence that it 
was being used. This included grounds for believing it would be used 
again. The accused's arguments that he could have entered the car 
after the smoking took place and may, even if he was present, not have 
been the one who smoked or possessed the contraband, were rejected. 
Responded the Court: 
if police officers were permitted to allow suspects 
to proceed on their way because of a possibility of inno-
cence (despite their reasonable and probable grounds), few 
persons guilty of an offence would ever be detected". 
(The portion between parenthesis is mine and is necessary to convey 
the Court's intent apparent from of other passages in the reasons for 
judgement). 
The smell was strong. If the accused entered the vehicle after the 
smoking took place, then accepting a ride in that vehicle subjected 
him to the consequences of the conclusion police could draw from that 
evidence. 
The search police conducted was in accordance with authority granted 
under s. lO(l)(d) N.C.A. The search was not unreasonable in any way. 
The accused argued that the search which resulted in finding marihuana 
on him occurred at a time prior to him receiving the legal advice he 
had indicated to the officers, he wanted without delay. This means, 
submitted the accused, that the right to counsel had been infringed 
when he was searched. Consequently the evidence obtained by that 
search should have been excluded. The Court reasoned that it would 
have been entirely proper for police to have searched the accused at 
the roadside, immediately upon his arrest. In this case, out of 
courtesy to the accused, he was takem out of inclement weather and 
public view and then searched at the police station. Nothing had, 
because of the "change of venue", changed in respect to · the police's 
authority to search the accused. He was not demanded like a suspected 
impaired driver to produce evidence. He was simply, due to the lawful 
arrest, a person police have a right to search. Said the Court: 
"There were no options open to the accused upon which he 
might require the advice of counsel prior to the 
search ••• To say otherwise would be to impede the police 
in the due execution of their duty to investigate in 
circumstances in which they have reasonable and probable 
grounds for believing a crime to have been committed." 
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The Manitoba Court of Appeal concluded that the accused's submissions 
and claims are inconsistent with the meaning and intent behind the 
Charter. Furthermore the Justices then seemed to join in with their 
B. C. counterparts in saying that even if some infringement was 
involved 
the wording of s. 24(2) of the Charter suggests that 
illegally obtained evidence will continue to be admitted, 
save in those cases where its admission would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute." 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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THE REASONS WHY B.C.'S COMPULSORY BLOOD TEST LAW WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Regina v. Chatham and Regina v. Ketola, 23 c.c.c. (3d) 434, British 
Columbia Supreme Court. 
Q.iite within its legislative purview, the B. C. legislative assembly 
enacted that where a peace officer has reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe that a driver (or a person who was driving within the last 
2 hours) has consumed alcohol, he may demand of that person to supply 
a sample of ~lood for the purpose of analysis. 
This law was supposed to catch drivers who were injured or faked 
injuries when involved in an accident. 
There is not too much detail on the circumstances involving the 
accused Chatham but Ketola was a motorcycle rider who collided with a 
car and was transported to hospital by ambulance. It was obvious he 
had been drinking and the investigating officer demanded he give a 
sample of blood. As a result Ketola was charged with "over 80 mlg." 
under s. 220.1(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act. Chatman was charged with 
the same offence. Both were acquitted as the respective trial judges 
found the compulsory blood test law to be excessive in view of our 
rights under the Charter. The B. C. Attorney General appealed. 
At the outset of his judgement and all through his reasoning the 
Justice of the B. c. Supreme Court recognized and acknowledged the 
enormity of the devastation the drinking drivers are causing in 
society. He indicated to be cognizant that restricting our freedoms 
to reduce such consequences of adverse behaviour is justified. 
However, there must be a balance between the severity of the ailment 
and the side-affects of the medication. 
Firstly the Court found that the prerequisite grounds for making the 
demand is for the police to believe that a driver has consumed 
alcohol; not the commission of an offence. Also that there is no 
connection between those grounds and the offence of "over 80 mlg. 
created in the same section of the Motor Vehicle Act. The vile does 
not even refer to the other. Therefore the provision for the demand 
is arbitrary. To drink and drive is not an offence, only where it 
causes impairment or a blood/alcohol level in access of "80 mlg. per 
100 milliliters of blood." 
Driving is not an offence but speeding is. The blood test legislation 
is the equivalent of given police authority to demand from every 
person who operates a car to present proof of the speed of the car. 
Furthermore s. 220. 2(1) M. V .A. does clearly provide that the demand 
may be made of a person who drove within the last two hours and has 
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consumed alcohol... just before he drove, yesterday, last year or 
whenever. The latter, we must assume is a construction error, but the 
section nevertheless does so provide. 
As the section stands, with non-compliance constituting an offence, 
the demand by a police officer being intimidating and there not being 
any connection or link between it and any offence, it (the section) 
provides for an involuntary deprivation of the liberty and security of 
the person. This is quite in violation of section 7 of the Charter 
which assures "the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person". The legislative draftsman did "cast a net" so broad that it 
ensnares innocent persons in circumstances totally irrelevant to the 
massive evil of impaired driving which the Crown says was to be curbed 
by the legislation that allows an assault (taking of blood) upon mere 
suspicion of a vague fact unconnected with anything. The legislation 
then creates an offence for the victim for not permitting the assault. 
Furthermore the legislation allows an unreasonable search and seizure 
on account of the lack of any link with an offence. This renders it 
unjustified under s. 1 of the Charter. 
The B. C. Supreme Court held that admission of evidence obtained by 
the provision of s. 220.1(2) M.V.A. to prove any offence, would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
Dismissals upheld. 
Comment: When reading the reasons for judgement one is inclined to 
predict that if the Crown had not appealed by means of stated case, 
the B. C. Supreme Court would have declared the legislation "without 
force or effect" under s. 52 of the Charter. The stated case posed 
specific questions directly related to the reasoning by the trial 
judges. Probably the Supreme Court was restricted to respond to the 
narrow question contained in the stated case. 
J~ also is reasonable to infer that the Court is very sympathetic to 
th~ apparent objective of the law makers in enacting s. 220.1(2) 
M.V.A. It seems to suggest that legislation less broad, linked to an 
offence, with realistic prerequisite grounds to the demand will be 
considered constitutional. 
In December 1985, one month after this decision by the B. C. Supreme 
Court, section 220.2(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act was amended. 
Although the following case is in relation to the law as it was before 
the amendment, the County Court's reasons for judgement delivered in 
May of 1986, may well apply to practices surrounding the demanding and 
taking of bloodsamples under the new law. 
* * * * * 
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Regina v. Constantinescu, County Court of Yale, Vernon Registry No. 
15231, May 1986. 
Prior to the former provisions for the taking of blood samples under 
s. 220. l of the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act meeting with constitutional 
difficulties as explained in the Chatham and Ketola cases above, a 
police officer demanded from the accused Constantinescu a sample of 
her blood while she was being attended to in the emergency ward of a 
hospital. She had been the driver of a car and sustained injuries 
in an accident. She had been taken by ambulance from the scene to the 
hospital. 
The officer did tell the accused of her right to remain silent and 
that of access to counsel without delay. The officer conceded to have 
made the demand for a blood sample to collect evidence for a 
drinking/driving charge under the Criminal Code of Canada rather than 
for the offence of "over 80 mlg." under the Motor Vehicle Act. 
However, he did not inform the accused of that purpose, neither did he 
make the accused aware that with the exception of breath on demand, no 
person is obliged to give any sample of a bodily substance for 
chemical analysis for evidence under the Criminal Code. Evidence that 
there was a refusal to give such a sample or that it was not taken, is 
inadmissible. (See s. 237(2) c:c.). 
The accused had complied with the officer's demand and was 
consequently charged with impaired and dangerous driving. The Court 
had to decide if the evidence resulting from the analysis of the blood 
was admissible. After all, s. 237(2) C.C. does not render 
evidence that a sample of a bodily substance was taken or the results 
of an analysis of that substance inadmissible. 
When the officer made the demand for a bloodsample, the enabling 
legislation had not yet been declared excessive from a constitutional 
viewpoint by the B. C. superior courts. However, when a law is found 
to be constitutionally flawed we must consider it to have been so from 
the date it came into effect and not from the date it was judicially 
declared to be in some conflict with our supreme law. It then follows 
that in this case the officer made the demand under law that was 
unconstitutional from the outset. 
That the law was apparently in tact in that the contrary had not yet 
been decided when the officer made his demand, did have a bearing on 
the Court dealing with the matter of good faith and the officer's bona 
£ides. After all, s. 237(2) C.C. is silent on the matter---of 
admissibility of the evidence resulting from an analysis of a bodily 
substance and outside of s. 24(2) of the Charter, the principle that 
evidence regardless how obtained is admissible, still applies. 
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Legally then there was no basis for the officer to make the demand for 
the sample of blood. The provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act under 
which he made the demand were in conflict with the rights established 
under s. 7 and 8 of the Charter. Consequently the accused's rights to 
the security of her person and that rendering her secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure had been infringed. This triggered 
consideration under s. 24 of the Charter for exclusion of the evidence 
resulting from the blood analysis. This left the Court to consider 
the circumstances (including the matter of good faith on the part of 
the officer) and whether admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
Obviously referring to the officer's intent to use the evidence 
resulting from the analysis of the accused's blood for charges under 
the criminal code rather than under the Motor Vehicle Act (despite the 
fact that she was not obliged to give any sample for that purpose) the 
Court found that the "demand" had been misleading. Said the Court: 
"The officer, in attempting to do indirectly what he was 
not entitled to do directly, and without being candid and 
informing the accused of the true purpose of his demand 
and the provisions of s. 237(2) of the Code, has shown a 
certain deviousness, a lack of candor, an unfairness of 
the pocedure followed, and therefore a lack of bona fides 
compelling the Court in this instance to rule the blood 
sample as being inadmissible." 
This took care of good faith and "circumstances". As a consequence 
the admission of the blood evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
* * * * * 
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SUSPECT SWALLOWING - JUSTIFICATION OF DETENTION 
OBTAINING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Duman, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 366 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
In the opinion of the courts, the police officers in this case had a 
sincere but erroneous belief re continued detention of a person they 
suspected of having swallowed drugs for the purpose of storage. The 
accused, whom the officers suspected of having illicit drugs in her 
possession did, despite the choke hold, swallow something. They took 
her into custody and informed her of her rights to counsel. The 
reason for the custody was to keep her detained for up to 30 days so 
whatever she passed could be seized or for her to go to a hospital to 
have vomiting induced. The accused was informed of the reason for her 
arrest and was officially given the choice of the "up to 30 days 
custody" or up-chuck. She did not make any phone calls but elected to 
go to the hospital where the drugs she had swallowed were recovered. 
All of this led to a conviction of possession of a narcotic for the 
purpose of trafficking. She appealed this conviction to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal claiming that: 
1. her election to go to the hospital 
retrieved was induced by misleading 
erroneous in respect to the law; 
and have the narcotics 
and police statements 
2. her rights to counsel had been infringed as no phone was made 
available to her; and that 
3. her rights to security of her person, not to be arbitrarily 
detained and to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure 
had been violated. 
All or any one of these matters, the defence claimed, should have 
resulted in the exclusion in evidence of the . retrieved narcotics and 
the certificate of analysis. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal observed that the police officers had a 
duty to seize and preserve the contraband they had reasonable grounds 
to believe were in the possession of the accused. Although the law 
they cited as authority for holding her was erroneous, the actual 
period the accused had been detained had not extended beyond a period 
of time the officers were authorized to detain her. Furthermore, 
there was no evidence that the erroneous quoting of law was done 
maliciously; there was no evidence of "bad faith". 
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The case was distinct from R. v. Therens*. There the accused was 
compelled by law to do something. In this case the law did not 
require anything from the accused. Therefore the apparent strictness 
aP'plied by the Supreme Court of Canada in holding that the evidence 
supporting a "drinking/driving" allegation against Therens must be 
excluded, did not compel the same consideration in this case. 
The accused was an intelligent person. When arrested she was given 
her rights to counsel and obviously understood them. When she asked 
immediately upon her arrest if she could talk to a lawyer, she was 
told she could if that is what she wanted. At the station she did not 
ask for the use of a phone. Depending on how naive a person is in 
these matters, it may in some cases be the duty of police to provide a 
phone whether asked to do so or not. However, the accused was 
knowledgeable in these matters and not voluntarily providing her with 
a phone did not infringe her right to counsel. 
There simply were no flagrant or overt violations of the accused's 
rights. But, even if these circumstances had amounted to infringe-
ments of her rights, "exclusion of the evidence and not its admission 
••• would bring the administration of justice into disrepute". 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
* Regina v. Therens, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 - Page 1, Volume 21 of this 
publication. 
- 19 -
DOES THE NEW PROSTITUTION LAW OFFEND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION? 
Regina v. McLean and Regina v. Tremayne - Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, Vancouver Registry No. CC860492 and CC 860563, May 1986. 
The two accused were charged with communication with a person in a 
public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution contrary to 
the recently enacted s. 195.1( l)(c) C.C. Defence counsel challenged 
the constitutionality of this law and the provincial court judge found 
that it suffered of "overbreadth" and did therefore violate the 
Charter. The Crown appealed that decision. 
The Chief Justice of the B. C. Supreme Court did preside over these 
appeal proceedings. From my perspective the tenor of his reasons for 
judgement is a predominant feature of it. It seems to have a 
reprimanding tone when it reviews the considerations the defence 
counsel's arguments had received in the provincial court; it appears 
to deliver "the message of law" with patriotic and evangelistic 
vigor. When the words "seem" and "appears to" are used above, I 
strictly refer to my own impressions of the judgement. 
The Chief Justice said that the solicitation practices by prostitutes 
have associated problems that flow from the "unregulated conduct". In 
Canada (unlike many other nations) we attempt to control those 
practices by means of criminal law instead of regulations or by means 
of enabling legislation so subordinate governments can regulate this 
historic trade. (This last observation is strictly mine although it 
is not impossible that the words "unregulated conduct" were, at least, 
a Freudian slip. In any event, whatever the Chief Justice's opinion 
may be on the solution to the prostituion problem it would probably 
have been improper for him to use his judicial response to a narrow 
question of constitutional law to advocate what elected 
representatives should do about it.). 
The Chief Justice reviewed our previous solicitation laws and said 
that the results of the welknown Hutt* decision by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in 1978 had been "disastrous": 
"Prostitutes and pimps were left free to solicit at will, 
adversely affecting the tranquility and amenities of whole 
neighbourhoods". 
He recognized that police were rendered powerless to control the 
situation and municipal governments did not have the legislative 
Hutt v. The ~een, 82 D.L.R. 45. 
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competence to remedy the chaos. He also considered the common law 
injunction for which the B. C. Attorney General finally petitioned the 
Supreme Court for, as a "drastic step". It seems the Chief Justice 
expressed disappointment that the problem required an extraordinary 
judicial remedy to give an interim relief regarding a public nuisance 
that should have been resolved by the executive and legislative 
branches of government. 
After having reviewed the history of the soliciting laws, the Chief 
Justice addressed himself to the legal arguments that had led to the 
ruling by the provincial court judge that the new s. 195.l(l)(c) C.C. 
suffered from "overbreadth" and did thereby "constructively violate" 
s. 2(b) of the Charter (freedom of expression). The provincial court 
judge had struck down the words "or in any manner communicates or 
attempts to communicate with any person" in the section which, of 
course, removed the teeth from this law and left it a lame duck in 
regard to its objective (the authority for this can be found in s. 
52(1) of the Charter). 
The Chief Justice did not understand what a "constructive" breach 
means "Either there is a breach or there is not" he said. 
Furthermore the provincial court judge had applied the U. s. 
"overbreadth" principle, which is not known to Canadian law. 
The Chief Justice indicated that the Provincial Court Judge should 
have followed the procedure established by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in February of this year when it went through a similar exercise to 
determine the validity of legislation*. A Court must first determine 
whether the law in question violates the Charter. Only if it does 
then that Court must determine if that inconsistency with the Charter 
is "demonstrably jutified in a free and democratic society". If it is 
not so justified then the Court may declare the law, insofar as i t is 
inconsistent with the Charter, without force or effect (s. 1 and 52 of 
the Charter res.pectively). 
Defence counsel submitted to the B. C. Supreme Court that s. 
195.l(l)(l)(c) c.c. offends the freedom of speech and the freedom of 
association in that it prohibits a prostitute (a trade not proh~bite<l 
by law) to speak freely "with respect to offering and accepting se~: 
for money" and the prostitute's freedom to associate with the 
customers of her legal trade. 
The Chief Justice responded that our speech is controlled in many 
other areas of communications. One cannot holler "Fire" in a crowded 
theatre; we are not to swear or use obscene language in a public 
place; we may not threaten anyone; our communication is very much 
subject to laws of libel and slander; etc. Defence counsel had argued 
that all of those restrictions on communications are to prevent a harm 
* Regina v. Oakes - See Volume 23, page 16 of this publication. 
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where solicitation creates no harm. Said the Chief Justice in 
response: "the submission is simplistic in its approach". Many people 
who do not want to be solicited, are, and they are offended to be 
approached by someone "seeking to purchase sex". In regard to the 
enshrined freedom of speech, the Court said that to include soliciting 
for the purpose of sex in that constitutional principle is to demean 
its grant concept as it does not advance any social value. 
Furthermore the section in question does not in principle prohibit the 
words that are spoken, but the conduct of the soliciting prostitute:--
Defence counsel also argued that the section was too vague. "Far 
reaching it may be, but vague it is not" replied the Court. Many 
conducts will be brought before the Courts which will have to 
determine if it is caught by the section. There is nothing in this 
section that is different from others in that regard; it simply is a 
function of the Judiciary. 
Crown's appeal was allowed and the cases 
were ref erred back to the Provincial Court 
for continuation of the trials. 
* * * * * 
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FORGERY - BELIEVING TO HAVE AUTHORIZATION TO ENDORSE A CHEQUE 
Regina v. Borland, County Court of Cari boo, Fort St. John No. 227 2, 
April 1986. 
The accused had endorsed a family allowance cheque made out to a woman 
he used to live with. The accused endorsed the woman's as well as his 
own name to the cheque (in the sum of $31. 27). He received the cash 
and used the money on himself. 
The accused, in his defence, claimed that he thought he had the 
woman's consent or at least, was honestly mistaken about such 
consent. He relied on a case decided by the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal* which said that endorsing another person's name to a document 
is not criminal forgery if there is evidence that the endorsement was 
authorized. The accused claimed that when he lived with the payee, 
all moneys were pooled and it was then condoned that he signed and 
cashed cheques of this kind. Therefore there was implied 
authorization that made the forgery not a culpable act. 
The Crown showed how the accused and the payee had separated a month 
before the cheque arrived in the mail. The accused had stolen the 
cheque from the woman's mail box. Furthermore, if the accused 
sincerely believed to have been authorized to endorse the cheque as he 
did, why would he (as he claimed he did) have looked for the payee for 
an hour to get the consent to cash the cheque. He had apparently gone 
ahead when he could not find her. This was totally inconsistent with 
an honest belief of consent. 
Accused convicted. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Cechane, 20 c.c.c. (2d) 542. 
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FRAUD - FORGERY AND POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY BY 
CASHING STOLEN CANADA SAVINGS BONDS 
Regina v. Fraser, County Court of Westminster, New Westminster, B. c., 
No. X015445, May 1986. 
Fifty thousand dollars worth of Canadian Savings Bonds were stolen 
from an elderly Mrs C. in Victoria. The prostitute he went to, in 
turn stole the bonds from him. Not being familiar how to cash savings 
bonds the prostitute obtained the accused's name through an acquain-
tance as someone who could assist her. In the company of the 
prostitute and one of her professional colleagues, the accused cashed 
the bonds at two or more banks in Vancouver. The prostitute signed 
Mrs. C's name to the bonds. 
Consequently the accused and the prostitute were charged with several 
counts of fraud, forgery and possession of stolen property. The pros-
titute entered pleas of guilty but the accused opted for the Crown to 
prove his guilt. 
The defence insisted that the accused was made to believe that the 
prostitute had earned a large amount of money in her trade which she 
invested in bonds under the false name of "Mrs. Margaret C". He had 
done what he could to make sure the bonds were not stolen by having a 
friend (deceased by the time of trial) check at the bank if the bonds 
were listed as stolen. For his assistance he had received as per 
arrangement, 15% of the value of the bonds. He explained that cashing 
the bonds in the Vancouver area instead of Victoria was all part of a 
claimed tax fraud the prostitute was perpetrating. He did not know 
the details of the scam but she had insisted that the cashing-in was 
to be done in Vancouver for that reason. 
The Crown adduced evidence from the person who approached the accused 
for his services, that he was told the bonds were "hot", and that they 
had been stolen from a "trick". It was also shown that the accused 
had in preparation for the cashing of the bonds, arranged for identi-
fication for the prostitute in the name of "Margaret C". He had even 
arranged the incorporation of a company to accommodate this deception. 
The credibility of the Crown witnesses had left something to be 
desired. Consequently defence counsel argued that if the accused was 
tried by a jury it would have to be instructed that the accused's 
explanation was capable of creating a reasonable doubt as it might 
reasonably be true. The accused's defence was also one of "mistake of 
fact". He had simply believed in a set of facts which, if true, would 
make his actions innocent ones. Doubt about him having had such an 
honest belief would have to be resolved in his favor. Furthermore the 
belief need not be reasonable. An honest belief simply negates any 
criminal intent. 
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The Court responded by saying: 
"The threshold question of whether the evidence conveys a 
sense of reality to the assertion that an accused was 
acting under a mistaken belief, is distinct from the 
question of whether the accused ' s mistaken belief is 
reasonable or not." 
In other words the mistaken belief in fact needs to have an air of 
reality to it. The reasons for judgement by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the well-known Papajohn* case indicate that an air of 
reality must exist to establish the mistaken belief. Papaj ohn was 
tried for rape and consent became the kernel issue. He said that he 
honestly believed the complainant consented; she said there simply was 
no consent. The Court had held that assertions of mistaken belief 
must be supported by sources other than the accused to give it "an air 
of reality". If this was not so, a simple assertion that there was 
such belief regardless how bizarre in the circumstances, would provide 
a defence. 
The accused was labelled as a "scoundrel". He had lied to the banks, 
police, and the Court. However, the evidence of the Crown was full of 
inconsistencies and holes. The credibility of the prostitutes and 
their friends was such that very few facts could be found or inferred. 
The accused's surreptitious activities were as consistent with what 
was alleged against him as what it was with the tax scam he claimed 
the prostitute was perpetrating. Therefore the Court had no alterna-
tive but to acquit the accused on all counts. 
* * * * * 
* Papajohn v. The Queen (1980 52 c.c.c. (2d) 481. 
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MEANING OF "OTHER FRAUDULENT MEANS" 
Regina v. Bruton, County Court of Westminster, No. 15324 Chilliwack, 
B.C., January 1986 
An 83 year old widow who had "failed recently" in terms of health and 
memory, testified how the accused (who lived in the same apartment 
building as she did) had socially forced himself on her. The approach 
by the accused who experienced considerable financial difficulties and 
an alcohol problem, was one of "a foot in the door" from a figurative 
and literal viewpoint. He treated the widow gentlemanly and they 
visited back and forth. The widow could not recall details, but said 
that the accused was continuously asking her for money without saying 
for what it was to be used. Neither was there any understanding with 
the accused about repayment. The elderly woman issued within two 
months cheques payable to the accused in the aggregate sum of approxi-
mately $18,000. He had asked and she gave. There was no threat of 
any kind and the woman's claims that the accused at one time, had 
confined her in his apartment was rejected by the Court. What the 
Court did accept was her claim that the accused was troublesome. 
The accused had lived lavishly off the money. He generously bought 
drinks for everyone in the house when visiting bars; he tipped a taxi 
driver several hundred dollars, etc •• When asked about the origin of 
the money he told how he had won it in a lottery. 
The accused was charged with having defrauded the elderly woman "by 
deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means", of monies in excess of 
$200. In view of the fact that there was no evidence of falsehood or 
deceit on the part of the accused, his guilt or innocence hinged on 
the meaning of · "other fraudulent means". In other words, were the 
means by which the accused obtained the money from the woman 
fraudulent? 
To determine the answer the Court turned to a leading case* decided by 
the Supreme Court of Canada as well as articles and court decisions 
that resulted from that case. Our highest Court had held that "other 
fraudulent means" include means which are not in the nature of false-
hood and deceit. Needless to say that those means by which a victim 
has been deprived of property, must be dishonest. Deprivation is 
proven when the Crown has shown "detriment, prejudice or risk of 
prejudice to the economic interests of the victim". In short, to 
prove fraud by means other than falsehood and deceit, the Crown must 
establish dishonest deprivation. In respect to dishonesty the Court 
held that it was a standard of conduct which is "discreditable as 
being at variance with straight forward or honourable dealings". 
* R. v. Olan, Hudson & Hartnett, 41 c.c.c. (2nd) 145. 
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The accused Bruton argued that there was no falsehood, no deceit or 
dishonesty on his part in his dealings with the woman. His lies as to 
the origin of the wads of bills he produced on various occasions had 
no bearing on the obtaining of the funds he argued. He simply told 
his widowed neighbour, "I have no money, I need and want some: and she 
obliged him" submitted his counsel. 
The Court applied the current standard of honesty among ordinary 
decent people and concluded that the victim was deprived of money by 
means belonging to the category of cunning. By current standards, 
considering all circumstances, what the accused did was dishonest. 
Accused convicted of fraud. 
* * * * * 
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DO UNTRUE STATEMENTS OF FACTS IN AN INFORMATION UPON WHICH A SEARCH 
WARRANT IS ISSUED, RENDER SUBSEQUENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNREASONABLE? 
Regina v. Sismey, County Court of Yale, July 1984*, Penticton 73/84 
Policeman A told policeman B how he had learned by means of judicially 
authorized interceptions of private communications and an informer, 
that the accused was trafficking in marihuana and/or cocaine. 
Policeman B, on the request of A, appeared before a Justice of the 
Peace and swore an information worded in the first person, in that 
the information stated that B. had intercepted the private communica-
tion and that he had received "reliable informaton" about the 
accused's trafficking. What complicated matters further is that 
according to the trial judge, Policeman A had given too liberal an 
interpretation to the information he had. As a matter of fact the 
Court said that it had been shown that the information A gave to B was 
so inaccurate that the former had demonstrated a callous indifference 
and contempt for what is right. The Justice of the Peace discretion-
ary function had been usurped by means of the inaccurate sworn inf or-
mation upon which .he issued a sea.rch warrant. 
Officer B executed the warrant and searched the accused's home. Ten 
grams of cocaine were found and the accused was charged with "posses-
sion for the purpose of trafficking" and was tried in County Court. 
In pre-Charter times, facts like these would not likely have affected 
the evidence obtained by the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is a 
judicial act and if the process was flawed in any way the accused 
would have to apply in separate proceedings to have the warrant 
quashed. It would not have been for the trial judge to review another 
judicial process. In other words, a trial judge, would not have been 
able to go behind the search warrant. 
In this case defence counsel persuaded the trial judge that he had an 
obligatlon to determine if the search of the accused's home was 
reasonahle. If it was not, then he would have to consider whether the 
evidence should be excluded in compliance with section 24(2) of the 
Charter. A search resulting from a sworn statement that is inaccurate 
is hardly reasonable argued the accused's counsel. The County Court 
observed that going beyond the warrant to determine the reasonableness 
of the search is unqiue, but agreed that our Charter makes this neces-
sary to determine admissibility of evidence resulting from the 
warrant. The judge then conducted a voir dire to make these 
* This decision came to my attention only recently. It seemed of 
sufficient interest to pass it on. 
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determinations and allowed defence counsel to challenge the informa-
tion upon which the warrant was issued. 
It was found as a fact that Officer B had no direct or personal knowl-
edge of the information he swore to. Neither did he make any attempt 
to verify some of the things A told him. It was further found that to 
say the least, the information was a highly inflationary interpreta-
tion of the intercepted communication and the so-called unidentified 
informant was considered totally unreliable by police as well as the 
court. 
In civil law ~ parte injunctions are granted by the Courts. Any 
inaccuracy in the information upon which the injunction is issued will 
void it. A search warrant results also from an ex parte procedure and 
the Court agreed that in view of the invasion of-Privacy that results, 
it also should be considered void if the information upon which it was 
issued is inaccurate. That, of course, renders the search warrantless 
and ipso facto unreasonable*. 
The officers "got carried away in the exercise of their duties" said 
the Court and "broke the principles of good faith, full disclosure and 
honesty". If the Justice of the Peace had known the facts as they 
were, he would possibly not have issued the warrant. The Court 
allowed defence counsel to prove that fact, and concluded: 
"To hold that his warrant . is valid and the search reason-
able would in my judgement make a mockery of section 8 of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and indeed of the 
present day concept of justice". 
The Court held that the warrant was void and the search for and the 
seizure of the cocaine unreasonable. Furthermore, particularly in 
view of the facts surrounding the information upon which the warrant 
was issued, the Court found that admitting the evidence obtained 
thereby would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The 
evidence was therefore excluded. Closing his reasons for judgement 
with: 
• law and justice and credibility are based 11pon 
truth, they are destroyed by untruth and deception and 
that would be distruction that must not be allowed to 
happen where it is seen and can be prevented" 
the Judge acquitted the accused. 
Comment: This case is indeed unique in view of the principles 
surrounding judicial reviews. When one member of the judiciary sits 
* See Hunter v. Southam Inc. Volume 18, Page 12 of this publica-
tion. 
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in judgement over matters decided by another member, then there better 
be a provision in law that authorizes that. If the accused in this 
case had wanted to render the search conducted by police a warrantless 
search for the purpose of determining the admissibility of its yield, 
the accused should have sought to have the warrant quashed by means of 
motion in a Court of superior jurisdiction. Judicially issued docu-
ments are traditionally considered valid and can only be invalidated 
by means of review procedure provided for by law. 
In this case the Court commented that the Justice of the Peace who 
granted the warrant had been given information that amounted to ample 
evidence to be satisfied that the informant (the officer) had reason-
able and probable grounds for believing that illegal drugs were in the 
accused's home. The application of course was done in the absence of 
the accused who, at his trial, had the first opportunity to challenge 
the credibility of the applicant. In other words the trial judge did 
something the Justice of the Peace was unable to do, i.e., permit a 
probing in an adversary setting of the accuracy of the information. 
Perhaps one could argue that the trial judge was therefore not review-
ing the judicial discretion exercised by the Justice of the Peace. If 
the trial judge had held that the information was inadequate to 
"satisfy" the Justice of the Peace of the reasonable and probable 
grounds prerequisite to the issuance of the warrant, then he would 
have reviewed the process involving the Justice of the Peace. That 
would probably have amounted to an unauthorized judicial review. 
The principle that judicially issued documents are valid on their face 
stems from the confidence we must have in our process. We recruited 
our judiciary from the human race which is not known for its infalli-
bility. The ref ore, reviews are not only desirable but essential. 
However, it cannot be applied randomly but must be in accordance with 
the rules and laws surrounding judicial law making (stare decisis). 
Court decisions are precedents and can in our system become law 
(comm.on law). Surely that system is already flawed by unavoidable 
long periods of not knowing the meaning of constitutional or statutory 
provisions. We ought not to complicate this with unauthorized judi-
cial reviews. 
As is clear, there are various views one could take of what happened 
in the trial of Mr. Sismey and it will be interesting what this 
decision will lead to. 
* * * * * 
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POSSESSION OF A WEAPON FOR. A PURPOSE DANGEROUS TO THE PUBLIC P.EACE -
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE RE INTENT TO USE LEGAL KNIFE AS A WEAPON 
Regina v. Bellamy, County Court of Yale, Vernon, B. C., Registry No. 
13930, October 1985. 
The accused, a farmhand, purchased a butterfly knife after checking 
with police if possessing the knife was legal. The court agreed that 
there was nothing in law that prohibited owning or carrying the knife, 
which was not designed to be used as a weapon. Therefore only the 
accused's intent could in law convert the knife into a weapon. 
In accordance with the Crown's allegation, in the early morning hours 
of the day on which the accused used or intended to use his butterfly 
knife as a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, the 
accused was in a. car which was passing a group of youths walking along 
the curb. Someone from this group yelled something at the accused and 
the car was immediately stopped in the center lane of the road. The 
accused (knife in hand) approached the group of youths. He had not 
noticed that a police car had also stopped and before the accused 
reached the curb . he was challenged by a police officer. The accused 
was obviously surprised at the presence of police and immediately 
discarded the knife he had been carrying with open blade by his side 
in a down position. When asked what he was doing with the knife he 
answered that he did not like to be called names. To the question: 
"Were you trying to scare the hell out of those kids?" the accused 
responded: "I guess so". 
The Court found that in the circumstances the knife had not yet become 
a weapon. 
"If the officer had not arrived at that particular moment, 
the accused may have crossed the line of forming a 
sufficient intention to use the knife as a weapon and for 
an unlav~fl 'l. purpose". 
Accused acquitted. 
Comment: It seems that when a person arms himself (which the accused 
did by baring the knife) and aggressively approaches a group of people 
for the purpose of retaliation (what else can a reasonable person 
infer in these circumstances) that ought to be sufficient evidence to 
Regina v. Flack , 65 W.W.R. 35. 
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find the intent necessary for the conversion of the knife into a 
weapon. The actions of the accused seemed beyond unpremeditated use 
of the knife out of sudden anger or annoyance. The description of his 
attitude when intercepted by the police officer was not the demeanor 
of a person who on the sudden due to insult or other aggravation 
resorted in anger to aggression. If circumstances as these are insuf-
ficient to infer that the knife was a weapon and that the accused's 
possession of it was dangerous to the public peace, the section is a 
legislative tiger with dental problems. 
* * * * * 
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POLICE ATTENDING TO NOISE COMPLAINT - FOUND MARIHUANA BY MEANS OF 
SEARCH OF APARTMENT - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Cain, County Court of Vancouver, Vancouver Registry No. 
CC851770, February 1986. 
The accused was tried for cultivating marihuana and the admissibility 
of the evidence became subject to a voir dire. 
Police attended to a noise complaint at the accused's apartment at 
3:30 in the morning. Five constables were taken to the apartment by 
the building manager, who was not the complainant and apparently 
unaware of any noise in the building. 
When the group reached the apartment, there was either no noise or it 
had quieted down. The officer seemingly in charge of the group could 
not recall which .was the case. He testified how the accused had said 
words to the effect that there was nothing going on in his apartment 
and that the officers should come in and look for themselves. As the 
officer considered it best not to charge in the first instance but to 
speak to the guests at a noisy party he had with two other constables, 
followed up on the accused's invitation. One of the constables had 
gone into the kitchen area and had felt heat. As he thought there may 
have been a fire starting he went to the origin of the heat. In a 
closet he found a 1000 watt light bulb encouraging potted marihuana 
plants to do their natural best to sprout. The accused had admitted 
the plants were his and he was arrested. 
It is obvious that the County Court Judge did not believe the offi-
cers. In respect to the accused's invitation for them to come in and 
see for themselves the judge said: "I am not satisfied that the 
accused did utter those words or any others which could be construed 
as an invitation to the police to enter". 
The r0urt had believed the building manager who had given his evidence 
q 'L~ ' .ly, detached and strai;sht forward. He testified that the accused 
was intoxicated, "hollering" an' belligerent. He had stood in his 
doorway obviously barring entry ..:o his apartment. He had said: "You 
can't come in here unless you have a warrant". He had asked: "You 
don't have a search warrant?" and one of the constables had said, "Yes 
we do" and with that three of the five officers had just walked in. 
As they went through, the accused had lowered his arm so there was no 
shoving. 
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When the plants were found, the accused was handcuffed and at one time 
made to lay on his stomach on the floor. He testified that when he 
was taken in the elevator in the police building to the booking area 
he was beaten and kicked. His evidence was corroborated by a physi-
cian who said the accused had two fractured ribs at the "lower" chest 
wall. The accused had complained right away. A nurse had "briefly" 
examined him and she said that pressure she had applied to the "upper" 
rib cage had not evoked any pain. 
The Court found that the broken ribs had been sustained after the 
arrest and before being booked at the jail as a result of police 
action. The Court also found the police officers not recalling 
pertinent matters as incredible. 
The Court held that there was a direct link between the illegal entry 
of the apartment and the seizure of the marihuana plants. There was 
no such link between the discovery of the evidence and the treatment 
the accused received after the arrest was effected. However, that 
behaviour reflected on their actions entering and searching the apart-
ment. 
The accused's rights had clearly been infringed. His hostile and 
improper attitude had not justified the ation on the part of police. 
The Court held that the administration of justice would indeed be 
brought into disrepute if the marihuana plants were admitted into 
evidence. 
Evidence excluded. 
* * * * * 
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TAKING OF BLOOD SAMPLE WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
ADMISSIBILITY OF ANALYSIS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CRIMINAL 
NEGLIGENT DRIVING CAUSING DEATH 
Regina v. John, B. C. Court of Appeal, Vancouver Registry CA002573, 
May 1986. 
The accused drove at high speed into an intersection. He failed to 
comply with a stopsign, collided with another motor vehicle, and 
struck a house situated on one of the corners of the intersection. A 
passenger in the car the accused collided with was killed. 
Police had found the accused unconscious a short distance from his 
vehicle. He had a strong smell of alcoholic drink on his breath and 
was surrounded by beer bottles including an opened one. When police 
attended at the emergency ward of the hospital a doctor was in the 
process of taking blood from the accused for "medical purposes". The 
accused was still in an unconscious state. Without referring to any 
statute or authorization the officer asked the doctor to take some 
blood for him. The doctor, without being told anything by police that 
substantiated his belief that it was his duty to co-operate in these 
circumstances, did comply with the officer's request. The doctor had 
thought that the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act required him to so comply. 
The accused was acquitted of Criminal Negligent Driving Causing Death, 
Dangerous Driving, Impaired Driving and "over 80 mlg.". The Crown 
appealed. 
The trial judge had held that the analysis of the bloodsample was 
inadmissible as the taking of the blood had amounted to an 
unreasonable search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. 
The court had also held that an I.C.B.C. insurance adjuster who was 
called by the Crown to relate some of the conversation she had with 
the accused was "a person in author! ty". She had not warned the 
accused in respect to his right to remain silent and the statc:ments 
W.?-r-e held to be given involuntarily and therefore inadmissible in 
e.rid~nce. 
In respect to the taking of the blood sample, the Crown conceded that 
it had been done illegally, but submitted that it was not 
unreasonable. The officer had ample grounds for believing that the 
accused was impaired by alcohol and that this had significant bearing 
on the serious accident the accused was involved in. The accused's 
right had been reasonably interfered with to afford and secure 
efficient law enforcement. Needless to say, defence counsel argued 
that the seizure of the blood had been both illegal and unreasonable . 
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The B. C. Court of Appeal found in favour of the Crown. It quoted 
from many other cases which were very similar in circumstances to this 
John case, including several decided by the U. S. Supreme Court. In 
relation to the unreasonable seizure of the blood the B. C. Court of 
Appeal relied on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Hunter v. 
Southam*. ~oting from the reasons for judgement the Court concluded 
that s. 8 of the Charter only protects a "reasonable expectation" of 
privacy. 
• • • as to whether in a particular situation the public 
interest is being left alone by government must give away 
to the government's interest in intruding on the individ-
ual's privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those 
of law enforcement". 
In relation to the I.C.B.C. adjuster being a person in authority, the 
trial judge was clearly wrong, held the B. C. Court of Appeal. For 
any person (other than those automatically considered a person in 
authority if the accused knows what their position is such as police 
officers, prison personnel, prosecutors) to be a person in authority 
he must, in the mind of the accused, be a person who may effect the 
path of prosecution. In other words the Courts must apply a 
subjective test. The accused did not testify in the voir dire to 
determine the admissibility of the statement he made to the adjuster 
nor did he call any witnesses to say he had considered her a person in 
authority. 
For these reasons the B. C. Court of Appeal 
allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a 
new trial. 
Comment: The B. C. Court of Appeal referred several times to a search 
warrant to obtain blood. It considered what had motivated the officer 
to proceed without a warrant and it was presumed that the urgency was 
to stay within the two hour limit from the time of driving. This, no 
doubt, is due to the provision in s. 237(1) (c.l) C.C. which provides 
that the result!:! of an analysis of blood taken within 2 hours of 
driving is proof of the blood alcohol level at the time of driving. 
Also, the U. S. cases refer to search warrants to get blood samples 
taken from a suspect. 
Firstly one wonders if in Canada a search warrant can be granted for 
this purpose and if the provisions of s. 237(1 )(c. l) C.C. would 
justify a warrantless search. The section does not say that the 
results of an analysis of blood is only admissible if it was taken 
* See Volume 18, page 12 of this publication. 
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within two hours of driving. The section seems simply to provide a 
presumption of equalization of blood alcohol levels at the time of 
driving and the time the blood was taken rather than an exhaustive 
means to have such analysis admitted in evidence. Section 237(1)(b) 
provides for such admissibility. If the analysis is admissible an 
expert could testify to the alcohol level of the suspect at the time 
of driving if more than two hours passed between driving and the 
taking of the sample. 
This then leaves the interesting question if a warrant can be granted 
for a person's body. In the U. S. the Federal Crime Rules are quite 
specific on this in that they provide that search warrants can be 
granted for "persons and places". Our B. C. Court of Appeal did not 
deal with this issue and only commented that the search of the accused 
was warrantless. However, there is a very interesting Canadian case* 
on this question of law. 
A Mr. Laporte was arrested for an unmentioned offence. It was noticed 
that he had a scar in the back of his neck that resembled a bullet 
wound. Laporte was also a suspect in an armed robbery that occurred 
some time ago which resulted in a shoot-out with police. All perpe-
trators got away but one had been wounded. (The reason for Laporte's 
arrest was totally unrelated to the robbery). An X-ray showed an 
object in Laporte 's neck which resembled a .38 calibre slug. An 
officer was granted a search warrant for the person of Laporte made 
out for two named officers to execute. A ballistics test could 
connect Laporte with the robbery. Laporte immediately petitioned the 
Quebec Queen's Bench to quash the warrant. Execution was postponed 
until the Court could rule on the petition which challenged the 
validity of the warrant. Another problem was the reluctance if not 
refusal on the part.of surgeons to operate, despite the warrant, on a 
non-consenting patient for the sole purpose of collecting evidence. 
For that reason the College of Physicians and Surgeons was represented 
before the Queen's Bench. The issues raised and the Court's responses 
are interesting and as follows in point form: 
1. The warrant stipulated that it was only valid on condition that 
tee surgery would not be dangerous to Laporte 's life. The medi-
c~l ~i.tne~~ had testified that all surgery was dangerous but that 
the pr)cedure necessary to remove the slugs was "simple" and "not 
serious". The Court responded that the danger to Laporte 
mentioned in the warrant went beyond the danger the surgeon 
contended is involved in all surgery. 
2. The warrant should have been addressed to a surgeon and not to 
police officers. The latter were incapable of executing it. The 
Court responded that the surgeon was no more than what a lock-
smith would be if police needed his expertise to gain access to 
premises or a vault. 
* Re LaPorte and The Q.ieen, 8 C.C.C. (2d) 343 (1972). 
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3. Laporte argued that the warrant violated the Bill of Rights 
(1960) in that he was being subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment. The Court responded that he was not being punished. 
Furthermore that the warrant, although unusual, did not impose 
anything cruel. Hundreds of citizens undergo surgery every day. 
4. The surgeons argued that the surgery would be unnecessary from a 
medical prospective, unethical and amount to an assault. The 
Court rejected these arguments and held that the surgeon like any 
other person would be protected under s. 25 C.C •• He would do no 
more than what he is authorized to do in the administration or 
the enforcement of the law. 
5. The Crown cited a number of U.S. cases where warrants for persons 
were issued (some are the same as those cited by the B. C. Court 
of Appeal) and observed that the prerequisite grounds for such 
warrants were the same as here. 
The Court disagreed with Crown Counsel and pointed out that the 
U. S. Federal Crime Rules and State laws specifically provide for 
warrants for persons. Our Criminal Code only provides for search 
warrants for "buildings receptacles and places". (s. 443(1) 
c.c.). 
The human body is not a building, neither is it a "place". The 
Interpretation Act dictates that a word must receive correspond-
ing and consistent interpretation. The word "place", in 
statutes, always refers to a geographical rather than an anatomi-
cal location. A person cannot be considered to be a receptacle 
either, although it can be a living thing for the display of any 
article or thing. 
The Court did apparently give some credit to the defence argument that 
the search warrant was totally unrelated to the matter for which 
Laporte was in custody. Although the Court did not say so, it vaguely 
implied that the warrant amounted to a fishing licence. In the B. C. 
case of R. v. John there was a definite link between the accused, his 
condition and the accident. Perhaps in the Laporte case there was no 
firm link between the scar on his neck and the bank robbery. 
In any event, the Quebec Queen's Bench quashed the warrant as there 
was no statutory or common law provision for a search warrant in rela-
tion to a person. Section 443. (1) c.c. still does only provide for 
warrants for buildings, receptacles and places. 
It may be of interest that warrantless searches of persons for samples 
of blood have not done badly in our Courts in respect to the admission 
of the resulting evidence. The Courts are so far holding that an 
unlawful search is not necessarily unreasonable. However, the burden 
in such case (as it is with all warrantless searches) is on the Crown 
to show the search was reasonable. 
* * * * * 
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WAIVING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BY INTOXICATED MURDER SUSPECT -
"AWARENESS OF CONSEQUENCES" TEST 
Clarkson v. The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, April 1986. 
Lorna Clarkson, the accused, phoned her sister in early morning hours 
to say that she just shot her husband (or "that someone shot him" 
suggested defence counsel in cross-examination). Several family 
members attended at the accused's home and police were called in. The 
officers found the accused in an hysterical state and seemingly 
intoxicated. She was arrested for murder and told of her right to 
remain silent and to counsel. She was then taken to hospital in the 
company of her aunt. The conversation in the car between the two 
women was quite inculpatory as the accused made admissions of guilt. 
These as well as other conversations at the hospital and casual 
remarks by the accused were all ruled inadmissible in evidence at her 
trial. 
At the police station the accused was again told of her rights and she 
said she understood her options. She consented to have the police 
interview sound recorded and frankly answered questions put to her. 
Her aunt was present during all of this. She had expressed concern to 
the officers and asked if it was proper for them to question her niece 
without a lawyer present. The officers explained how the accused 
could have one if she wanted to and how she was made aware of this. 
The aunt tried to pursuade the accused to get a lawyer and attempted 
to stop the interview. The accused replied that there was "no point" 
and that she did not need or want a lawyer. The statement she gave 
supplied the Crown with a confession which the trial judge would not 
allow to be admitted in evidence. He held that, due to the accused's 
condition her words were not her statement as she failed to comprehend 
what she was saying. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal allowed the 
Crown's appeal and held that the admissibility did not depend on the 
accused appreciating the possible consequences of what she was saying 
but whether she made her statement with "au operating mind". Her mind 
had been, despite her intoxication, sufficiently functional to give 
probative value to her words. 
The accused then took her plight to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In relation to the admissibility of the statements made by the 
accused, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that the different views 
expressed by the trial judge and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
reflect the conflicting lines of reasoning recorded in our case law on 
this topic. By holding that an accused must be aware of the conse-
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quences of what he or she s~ys for the statement to be admissible, the 
trial judge is applying the principle of "adjudicative fairness.,'. The 
Court of Appeal had applied the "operating mind" principle which 
basically only requires awareness on the part of the accused what he 
or she is saying and not necessarily knowledge of consequences. This 
conflict is similar to the argument surrounding the acceptance of 
evidence when it is known to be the truth; or adjudicating the 
fairness of the means by which the facts became known to determine the 
acceptance of those facts. In this case, one could consider taking 
advantage of the accused's state of sobriety (causing her possibly not 
to appreciate what was at stake) as being unfair while what she 
consciously said had probative value to determine the truth, a 
predominant objective of the trial process. 
The Supreme Court of Canada declined to resolve this uncertainty in 
law. The Court observed how in 1975* they had reiterated the discre-
tionary power of trial judges "to exclude evidence obtained in a way 
that violates .a principle of adjudicative fairness or fair treatment 
of the accused at the hands of police, notwithstanding the otherwise 
reliable nature of such evidence". They are in the best position to 
judge the need for excluding evidence on those bases. Consequently 
the Court did not decide whether the statement was properly excluded 
by the trial judge. Also this matter was pre-empted by the second 
defence issue raised in regard ·to the accused waiving her right to 
counsel while questioned by police. 
The defence argued that the accused's right to counsel was violated 
when police extracted from her the "intoxicated confession". To 
determine whether or not this right was infringed, adjudicative fair-
ness is the sole issue. "Probative value" of the evidence is of no 
consequence in such determination. Therefore the awareness not only 
of the right to counsel but also of the consequences of what a suspect 
says is "crucial". The constitutional provision is there to create 
fair treatment of an accused and a waiver (what the accused's 
rejection to get counsel amounted to) must be carefully considered. 
U. s. cases stipulated that there must be a full understanding of the 
implications before it can be said that an accused had knowingly and 
intelligently waived the constitutional right to counsel. This means 
being aware of the legal specificities. Apparently not wanting to go 
that far, the Supreme Court of Canada in response to this defence 
submission said: 
Whether or not one goes as far as requiring an accused to 
be tuned in to the legal intricacies of the case before 
accepting as valid a waiver of the right to counsel, it is 
clear that the waiver of the s. lO(b) right by intoxicated 
accused must pass some form of 'awareness of consequences' 
test". 
* Rosan v. The Queen [1975) 2 S.C.R. 574. 
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In this case that test was applied by the trial judge and it failed. 
Police should have waited with the questioning of the accused until 
she was sober so she could have given proper consideration · to the 
options the right to counsel afforded her. 
Accused's appeal allowed. 
* * * * * 
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ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST - RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Regina v. Pinkowski, County Court of Vancouver, Vancouver Registry 
No. CC851966, May 1986. 
A police officer noticed the accused's car veering across the center 
line of the road. This resulted in the car being pulled over, produc-
tion of driver's licence, failure of a few standard sobriety tests 
(finger to nose, etc.), arrest for impaired driving and the accused 
being informed of his right to counsel. 
The accused gave two samples of breath upon demand which indicated a 
blood alcohol level of 220 mlg. of alcohol per 100 ml. of blood. 
Three and one half hours after giving the first sample the accused was 
released and he went directly to a hospital demanding that a sample of 
his blood be taken. The hospital staff would not comply unless there 
was consent from police. This was denied by the officer who had 
booked the accused. 
The accused appealed his conviction of "over 80. mlg." claiming that 
his right to counsel and his right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty had been infringed. The officer had not made him aware 
of his right to counsel until he was arrested. The accused claimed he 
was in the circumstances "detained" long before the arrest was effec-
ted and should have been informed of his right at least before the 
roadside sobriety test. Secondly the refusal by police to consent to 
a blood test had affected his right to be presumed innocent. 
The Court responded to have "serious doubts" that what happened before 
the arrest would constitute detention, as meant in the Charter. 
Furthermore, even if the accused's version of detention would be 
correct in these circumstances, the reputation of the administration 
of justice would not be brought into disrepute if the evidence was 
admitted. Also, the Court wondered if police consent has any bearing 
on the taking of a bloods ample at the hospital.. Surely police are not 
responsible for hospital policy or for what hospitel staff may do. 
Accused appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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LEGAL TIO-BITS 
· Issue of "Voluntariness " re the Making of a Compulsory Declaration 
The Federal Fisheries Act compels captains of fishing vessels to make, 
upon demand, an accurate statement about the fish caught, bought, 
packed or canned along with other details about the vessel and its 
crew. ~ Mr. Gaugh was charged with failing to give such a statement 
accurately. The trial judge had conducted a voir dire on the admissi-
bility of the declaration Mr. Gaugh had made and had concluded it was 
not made voluntarily and therefore inadmissible in evidence. Further-
more the trial Judge held that the evidence was inadmissible as the 
fisheries officials had not made Mr. Gaugh aware of his right to 
counsel. In view of the many requirements to supply accurate informa-
tion under various laws, one can imagine the potential impact of a 
ruling of this kind. The Crown did appeal the acquittal of Mr. 
Gaugh. In regards to declarations, the Ontario Court of Appeal had 
held in 1973 that even though one is compelled by law to make a state-
ment improprieties may still occur and a voir dire should still be 
conducted. For instance someone could be intimidated to say that he 
was the driver of a car and then be obligated to make declarations 
under motor vehicle laws incumbent on drivers. The Alberta Court of 
Appeal held the opposite a year ·1ater and said that when one is by law 
obligated to make a statement, that statement is indeed made involun-
tarily but is admissible in evidence. If that was not so, common law 
would supersede statute law. In this Gaugh case, the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had been mistaken. The 
making of the very statement is the gravamen of the offence charged. 
It is an offence one must intend to commit and the Crown need not 
prove that the statement was made voluntarily. In respect to "right 
to counsel" the Court held that Mr. Gaugh was not under arrest or 
detained and therefore his rights were not infringed. Crown's appeal 
was allowed and the trial judge was ordered to admit the statement in 
evidence and continue the trial. 
Regina v. Gaugh, 23 c.c.c. (3d) 279. 
* * * * * 
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Burden on Accused to Prove Infringement of Right or Freedom 
Police demanded breath samples of the accused and the results of 
analyses showed a blood alcohol content in excess of "80 mlg. ". He 
had not been informed at any time of his right to counsel. The 
accused did not raise this issue during his trial and was convicted. 
He appealed and argued that constitutional infringement successfully 
and was acquitted. The Crown took the matter to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal which restored the conviction. The Court of Appeal held that 
the burden of proof that there was an infringement was on the accused 
when he was tried and not on the Crown. 
Regina v. Roach, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 262. 
* * * * * 
Executing Search Warrant While no one is at Home 
Police had a search warrant for a dwelling house in regard to unregis-
tered handguns. No one was home and police entered forcibly. The 
warrant was good for 10 days and there were no urgent or critical 
circumstances which justified immediate action. Weapons were seized 
and the accused petitioned a superior court to quash the warrant and 
declare the resulting evidence to be inadmissible. The Manitoba 
Queen's Bench allowed the petition. The Justice held that the resi-
dence could have been kept under surveillance and the warrant should 
have been executed when someone was home. Police had flagrantly 
invaded a private home. The police action had amounted to unnecessary 
abuse of authority. The search was hence unreasonable and contrary to 
s. 8 of the Charter. 
Re McGregor and The Queen, 23 c.c.c. (3d) 266. 
* * * * * 
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Unreasonable Search by Tavern Manager of a Customer 
A stubborn drinker returned to the tavern after he had been ejected 
because he could not prove his age. Being curious if the customer was 
"under age" the manager searched him after having technically effected 
an arrest. A small quantity of marihuana was found and the Crown 
preferred a charge of "possession". The accused argued that the 
search had infringed his rights to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and submitted that the evidence should be excluded. The 
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench held that the Charter applied to the 
manager and excluded the evidence. The Crown appealed arguing that 
the manager was not an agent of the government and therefore the 
Charter did not apply to him. The Alberta Court of Appeal did not 
rule whether the Charter applies to everyone but held that when a 
citizen makes an arrest he is exercising a right or performing a duty 
derived from "the sovereign himself". Therefore the act is one in 
obedience to the law and the person effecting the arrest is in those 
circumstances an arm of the state. In other words the manager exer-
cised a governmental function. A search upon arrest is the right of 
the person who makes it, provided the search is reasonable. In this 
case that part of the search by which the marihuana was discovered was 
conceded to be one of curiosity to see if the person the tavern 
personnel believed to be under age, was indeed as they suspected. 
That was unreasonable and not within the law that justifies searches 
upon arrest. The evidence had been justifiably excluded and the 
Crown's appeal was dismissed. 
Regina v. Lerke, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 129 - See also page 12 of Volume 19 of 
this publication. 
* * * * * 
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Youths Escaping from "Open Custody" 
Several youths were sentenced to serve a period of open custody. They 
lived in a cottage in an open setting on the grounds of an institution 
properly designated by the provincial government. Prior to the 
expiration of the sentence they climbed over the fence and left the 
premises. They were charged with "escape lawful custody" but the 
Youth Court found that "open custody" is not included in "custody" as 
mentioned in s. 133(b) of the Criminal Code. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal reversed this interpretation and held that one can be 
imprisoned without being confined in a prison. When the youths took 
their premature leave from the institution to which they were 
sentenced they did in fact, escape a lawful custody. 
Regina v. B.D. et. al., 24 c.c.c. (3d) 187. 
* * * * * 
Self crimination - Admissibility of Statement 
The accused used a stolen credit card to defraud his employer. He was 
questioned at his home and admitted to have used the card to make up 
phoney invoices. The investigators then arrested the accused and 
warned him in regard to his right to remain silent and to retain and 
instruct counsel. Appealing his conviction of fraud and forgery the 
accused claimed that his statement prior to the warning should be 
excluded. Failure to inform him of his right to remain silent and his 
right to counsel before the questionning began amounted to infringe-
ments of those very rights. The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed and 
reasoned that the accused was not detained when questioned at his home 
and there was no obligation to inform him of his right to counsel. In 
respect to the right to remain silent the court held that there is no 
constitutional or statutory obligation (other than for young offenders 
and during certain court proceedings) to inform a suspect of that 
right. The sole consideration for admissibility of the statement was 
voluntariness. There was no evidence that the accused was in any way 
made to believe that he was obligated to answer the investigators' 
questions. The statement was admissible and the accused's appeal was 
dismissed. 
Regina v. Esposito, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88. 
* * * * * 
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Enforcing a Repealed Regulation - Lawful Performance of Duty 
Alberta changed their regulations in respect to classes of driver's 
licences. A police officer who was unaware of the change ticketed a 
driver a few days later for having the wrong driver's licence, while 
in fact the licence was under the amended regulations valid for the 
vehicle the accused drove. When serving the summons/ticket at the 
scene the officer was obstructed and the accused consequently convic-
ted accordingly. He appealed, reminding the Alberta Court of Appeal 
of a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada* which held that 
peace officers only act lawfully if they act in the exercise of 
authority which is either conferred by statute or "derived as a matter 
of common law from their duties". 
The Crown in turn, reminded the Court of another Supreme Court of 
Canada** decision in 1975 where it held that acquittal does not 
necessarily invalidate an arrest or causes an officer not to have been 
in the lawful performance of duty when he effected the arrest for the 
offence of which the accused was subsequently acquitted. As long as 
it was apparent to the officer at the time he made the arrest that the 
accused committed the offence. The Alberta Court of Appeal held the 
two cases were totally distinct from one another and the case the 
Crown relied on had no relevance at all. Police in that case had 
reason to believe the person had committed an offence known to law. 
In this case police had a misconception of what the law was and made 
the arrest in light of that erroneous belief. 
Ignorance of the law does not excuse the offender, neither can it 
validate the enforcement by an authority of non-existent law. 
Appeal was allowed and conviction was set aside. 
Regina v. Houle, 24 c.c.c. (3d) 57. 
* * * * * 
* Regina v. Dedman, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97 - Also page 17 of Volume 22 
of this publication. 
** Regina v. Biron, 23 C.C.C. (2d) 513 - Also see page 32 of Volume 
16 "House Party - Creating Disturbance - Obstructing Police". 
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Possession of a Stolen Car - Presumption of Knowledge -
Admissibility of Refusal to Take a Polygraph Test 
The accused's fingerprint was found in a car that had been stolen. He 
readily admitted to have been in a car of similar description which 
friends had in their possession. He denied any knowledge that the car 
had been stolen or that he had driven it. He demanded the opportunity 
to answer those questions while connected to a polygraph. Later, 
however the accused refused to submit to a polygraph test. The trial 
judge had held that in the circumstances the accused ought to have 
known that the car had been stolen. By his own admission to police, 
he had occupied the driver's seat while the key was in the ignition. 
This meant he had possession of the stolen car. In regards to knowl-
edge the presumption created by the "doctrine of recent possession" 
was also applied. The explanation he gave had not been believed, 
therefore, it was presumed he had knowledge the car was stolen. The 
trial judge had also admitted in evidence the accused's refusal to 
take a polygraph test and had drawn an inference from it that was 
adverse to the accused. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld the 
reasoning of the trial judge in regard to recent possession. It also 
held that since the accused in his statement and also during his trial 
had referred to his offer to take a polygraph test, the Crown had no 
alternative but to explain why no such test was taken. Therefore the 
evidence of refusal was appropriately admitted and a judge or jury may 
draw inferences from such evidence as from any other evidence. 
Regina v. Smith, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 49 
* * * * * 
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Routine Vehicle Check - Arbitrary Detention 
The sole purpose for stopping the accused was to conduct a "routine 
vehicle check". It was then learned that the accused drove while 
disqualified under provisions of the Saskatchewan Vehicles Act and he 
was convicted accordingly. In his appeal the accused argued that 
police had no justifiable cause to stop him and had therefore 
arbitrarily detained him. By means of this infringement of his right, 
police had obtained the evidence supporting the charge of driving 
while disqualified. Consequently the evidence should be excluded and 
an acquittal ordered. In the Therens* case the Supreme Court of 
Canada said that detention means "a restraint of liberty of varying 
duration other than arrest in which a person may reasonably require 
the assistance of counsel" or "police assuming control over the move-
ment of the person by a demand or direction which may have significant 
legal consequences and which prevents or impedes access to counsel". 
However, in the Dedman** case the same Court held that from the common 
law duties of police flowed the duty to control traffic on public 
roads. The accused stopped and identified himself in compliance with 
directions the officer was authorized to give. Therefore, the routine 
check in this case was not unjustifiable use of power and the accused 
was not arbitrarily detained held the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 
Regina v. Iron, 24 c.c.c. (3d) 307 
* * * * * 
* Regina v. Therens, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 - Page 1, Volume 21 of this 
publication. 
** Dedman v. The Queen, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97 - Page 17, Volume 22 of 
this publication. 
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Right to Counsel and Right to be Informed upon "Roadside Demand" 
A Mr. Drapeau in Nova Scotia and a Mr. Burkart in Manitoba each 
encountered police while driving after having consumed alcohol. Both 
were demanded to give a sample of breath "forthwith" for a "roadside" 
test (s. 234.1 C.C.). Mr. Drapeau said "No" and was then arrested for 
so refusing. Upon that arrest he was for the first time advised of 
his right to counsel. Mr. Burkart did give a roadside sample. The 
results of the test led to a demand to accompany the officer and give 
samples for analyses by means of a breathalyzer. Mr. Burkart was, 
upon that demand (s. 235 C.C.), informed of his right to counsel for 
the first time during the entire encounter. He subsequently refused 
to blow. These gentlemen were charged respectively with refusing 
under 234.1 c.c. and refusing under s. 235 C.C. Eventually these 
cases ended up in the Nova Scotia and Manitoba Courts of Appeal with 
Mr. Drapeau and Mr. Burkhart both arguing that they should have been 
informed of their right to counsel when demanded to give a sample of 
breath for the roadside test. The Supreme Court of Canada in the now 
well known Therens decision, declined to say that there was a distinc-
tion between a demand under s. 234.1 and s. 235 C.C. in terms of 
"detention". If a demand under 234.1 C.C. then results in detention 
the suspect must, in accordance with the Charter, be informed of his 
right to counsel. This was not done in either case, therefore the 
infringement of that right ought to have resulted in consideration for 
the exclusion of the evidence of the refusals submitted Messrs. 
Drapeau and Burkart each to his own provincial Court of Appeal. An 
alternative remedy was to declare the compelling "forthwith" compli-
ance with a demand under 234.1 C.C. inconsistent with the Charter and 
hence without any force or effect. 
The two Courts of Appeal responded similarly and held that despite the 
fact that a demand constitutes detention, the limitation the word 
"forthwith" in s. 234.1 C.C. places on a person's right, the measures 
it impliments to protect the public are "demonstrably justified in our 
free and democratic society" (see s. 1 of the Charter). Both accused 
lost their argument and their appeals were dismissed. 
Regina v. Drapeau, 23 c.c.c. (3d) 376 (Nova Scotia) 
Regina v. Burkart, 24 c.c.c. (3d) 32 (Manitoba) 
* * * * * 
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Possession of Prohibited Weapon 
The accused, dressed in punk fashion wore a "spiked wristband". He 
was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and was acquitted 
in the Ontario provincial court. The trial judge had said that 
despite section 82(l)(c) of the Criminal Code and the "Order of the 
Governor in Council" declaring a "spiked wristband" a prohibited 
weapon, the accused could not be convicted unless the Crown also 
showed in compliance with the definition of "weapon" in the Criminal 
Code, that the band was "designed to be used as a weapon" OR was 
intended to be used as one. The accused wore and possessed the 
wristband, notwithstanding its peculiarity, as fashionable jewellery. 
When the County Court agreed with the trial judge's views, the Crown 
took the matter to the Ontario Court of Appeal. Weapon is defined as 
(a) anything designed to be used as a weapon OR (b) anything a person 
intends to use as a weapon whether or not it"""'W'as designed to be used 
as a weapon. The Court observed that (a) is an ojective definition 
and (b) a subjective one, and the word OR makes the two disjunctive. 
The trial judge had made the definitioni:n (a) (anything designed to 
be used as a weapon) subordinate to (b) (the intended use of anything 
as a weapon). As the trial judge had failed to appropriately apply 
those two separate definitions to the evidence before him, the Crown's 
appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered. 
Regina v. Murray, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 568. 
* * * * * 
Equality Before and Under the Law 
s. 542(2) c.c. provides that a person who has committed an indictable 
offence and who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity must 
at the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, be kept in 
strict custody. This means indef initt! custody. Any other percon who 
is acquitted is free to go where he pleases. This means t ·l-iat r.he 
provisions in s. 542 c.c. is discriminatory and violates s. 15 of the 
Charter, the B. C. Court of Appeal was told by a defence lawyer. His 
client was committed on account of having been found not guilty due to 
insanity at the time he threatened to use a weapon while committing an 
assault (s. 245.l(l)(a) c.c.). The B. C. Court of Appeal, in essence, 
responded that likes should be treated alike. All persons who are 
"not guilty" on account of insanity while committing an indictable 
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offence are treated the same• The distinction is that other acquit-
tals are on the basis of a person being legally innocent in that it 
was·not proven they did commit the crime or they had a legal justifi-
cation or excuse to comm.it the act. S. 542(2) deals with persons who 
were by legal process found to have commi·tted the alleged crime. The 
acquittal is on account of a mental condition and that places those 
covered under the disputed section in a different position. 
Between Mark K. Rebic and the Attorney General for B. c., Vancouver 
Registry, CA 004215, May 1986. 
* * * * * 
Is a Spouse who is a Competent Witness also Compellable? 
A Whitehorse woman stayed out dancing and drinking until early morning 
hours. When she arrived home an argument with her common law husband 
escalated in a wrestling match. The wife broke loose and made it to 
the kitchen where she armed herself with a meat cleaver. She then 
attacked her husband, wounding. him severely which resulted in a 
conviction of assault causing bodily harm. 
Just before the trial the common law couple (combatants) were 
married. When the Crown called the husband (victim) as the first 
witness, it was submitted that he preferred not to testify against his 
now legal spouse. It was argued that s. 4 of the Evidence Act renders 
a spouse only a competent witness but not a compellable one. The 
trial judge had rejected that submission and the trial resulted in a 
conviction. The accused appealed. 
The Yukon Court of Appeal (B. c. Court of Appeal) agreed with the 
trial judge and dismissed the appeal. 
Regina v. McGinty, Court of Appeal of the Yukon Terdtory, CA Y22/85, 
May 1986. 
* * * * * 
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Taking Wood from the Wild - Theft from Province of B. C. 
The accused went to the woods and got himself some firewood. He had 
done so with his father some years ago and had seen others do it. The 
grounds from which he took the wood was part of a provincial park and 
he found himself charged with theft of wood the property of the 
province of B. C. 
The accused claimed that the theft, in the circumstances and particu-
larly in view of his reasonable presumption that there was an implied 
permission to take the wood, was not carried out fraudulently without 
colour of right. The latter, of course, are the prerequisites to 
rendering the taking of the wood a culpable act. The Court did not 
buy the defence arguments. The accused had made absolutely no 
enquiries while he knew that someone owned what he took. He had been 
totally indifferent and blind to what he ought to have realized and 
did know. The judge of the County Court of Vancouver Island convicted 
the accused. 
Regina v. Lover, Port Alberni Registry, C.R. 214, January 1986. 
* * * * * 
Sharing Apartment Used to Store Contraband - Possession 
The accused shared an apartment with another tenant. Police conducted 
a search of the premises and found in various places large quantities 
of marihuana and paraphernalia indicating that the narcotic was not 
simply for personal use. The accused, when tried for possession of 
the narcotic, argued that the Crown had failed to prove she possessed 
the marihuana. In view of the large quantity, the County Court of 
Vancouver held that it would be stretching one.'s credulity to say that 
she as a tenant, n-: c- unaware of the marihuana in the apartment. 
Perhaps she did not iir.vr: axclusive possession but she did have posses-
sion as defined in s. 3(4) C.C. 
Regina v. Mar, Vancouver Registry CC851354, December 1985. 
* * * * * 
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Moving Rail Switch - Criminal Negligence 
Despite the discouragement of his companions, the accused (a 19 year old 
youth) smashed the lock on a railroad switch and placed it in a setting 
that would cause a passing train on the main track to go on a siding which 
was occupied by loaded freightcars. A train came along approximately 1 1/2 
hours later. The engineer saw the switch in the wrong position but could 
not stop. The train collided with the stationary freight cars and the 
engineer was very seriously injured. The damage was in excess of two 
million dollars. The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing 
bodily harm. He submitted in his defence that: (a) he had no intent to 
cause such harm; and (b) he "thought" he left the switch in the position he 
had found it in and that someone may have come along afterwards who placed 
it in the position that had caused the accident. 
In response to (a), the County Court held that when Criminal negligence is 
alleged the Crown need only to show intent for the act or omission, not the 
consequences of that act. In regards to (b), the Court considered the 
notion that someone equally mischievous as the accused would come walking 
along the same track (which as far as pedestrian traffic is concerned is 
abandoned) as no more than speculation and conjecture. 
Accused convicted. 
Regina v. Robins, County Court of Cari boo, Williams Lake Registry No. 
06620, December 1985. 
* * * * * 
Inexperienced officer making Suspect Aware of 
Right to Counsel too Late 
A demand was made of the accused to give samples of his breath. Apparent-
ly, no arrest was effected and the accused accompanied the officer as per 
the demand . No warnings as to right to remain silent or right to counsel 
were given. When at the police station, bef.ore giving a sample of his 
breath the accused was supplied with a telephone and told he had a right to 
retain counsel without delay. The accused declined to use the phone and he 
·gave the samples required f rom him. When in cross examination the officer 
was asked why he had not given the standard warnings he responded to be 
"relatively inexperienced" and had not thought it necessary. The accused 
appealed his conviction of over "80 mlg.". The Vancouver County Court held 
that there was nothing flagrant or deliberate about the policeman's 
actions. Neither had there been any adverse affects on the accused. It 
was not a case where it could be said that the officer flouted the law or 
that the administration of justice would be adversely affected. 
The accused's appeal was dismissed. 
Regina v. Taylor, Vancouver County Court, No. C.C. 860364, June 1986. 
* * * * * 

